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1. Introduction 
 
East Asian economies were hit hard by the financial crisis which originated in the U.S. in 
September 2008 (the “Lehman Shock”) and have experienced severe recessions. Although 
financial institutions in East Asia are in healthier condition than those in the U.S. and Europe 
which are weighted down by bad loans such as subprime mortgages (ADB 2009a), the real GDP 
growth rates of many East Asian economies are expected to become negative and even lower 
than that of the U.S., the seismic center of the crisis (IMF 2009).
1
 
This paper aims to identify the mechanism by which the crisis was transmitted to and 
amplified in East Asia. Specifically, we will address the following questions. First, how large is 
the impact of the collapse of the U.S. economy on East Asian industries? Second, what 
mechanism or structure amplified the impact in East Asia? To explore these questions, 
empirical analyses are conducted using the Asian international input-output tables (hereafter 
“Asian tables”) compiled by the Institute of Developing Economies (IDE-JETRO).2 Since the 
most recent version of the table is for the year 2000 and not suitable for analyzing the current 
crisis, the updated 2008 table was constructed by IDE-JETRO.
3
 
The analyses identify the magnitude of the impact of the sharp decline in U.S. imports on 
East Asian industries. The analyses also reveal numerically that the major transmission 
mechanism of the crisis is the regional production networks that have formed in East Asia since 
the late 1990s, i.e. the “triangular trade” through China. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the structures that amplified the 
shock transmission of the crisis. In section 3, the analytical methodology is presented, followed 
by the results of the empirical analysis. The paper discusses how the production networks in 
East Asia, which have become widespread in recent years, are related to the shock transmission 
of the economic crisis. Section 4 provides a summary and conclusions. 
 
                                                   
1 According to IMF forecast (as of October 2009), the real GDP growth rates in 2009 are projected to be 
lower than that of the U.S. (–2.7%) in many Asian economies (–5.4% in Japan, –2.0% in Korea, –4.9% in 
Taiwan, –4.5% in Hong Kong, –3.1% in Malaysia, –5.0% in Singapore, –3.2% in Thailand). 
2 For details of the Asian tables, refer to IDE (2006), Asian International Input-Output Table 2000, 
Statistical Data Series, No. 89 & 90, Chiba, Japan. 
3 See Inomata and Uchida (eds.) (2009) for details of the updating methodology of the table. 
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2. The structure of Asian trade: The triangular trade 
 
2.1 Economic growth in East Asia 
After the recession in the late 1990s caused by the Asian financial crisis, East Asian countries 
returned to sound economic growth (Table 1). From 2000 to 2007, Northeast Asian countries 
(China, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan) posted an annual real GDP growth of 4.4%, but excluding 
Japan the growth rate of the other three countries was as high as 8.3%. Especially, China 
enjoyed annual growth of over 10% and its economy, in real GDP terms, more than doubled 
during the observed period. Although not as dramatic as China, Korea and Taiwan also recorded 
steady growth of 5.1% and 4.0%, respectively. Southeast Asian economies (Indonesia, Malaysia, 
the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) also achieved annual growth rates in excess of 5%. 
However, since the financial crisis struck in the U.S. in the fall of 2008, the growth of East 
Asian economies has decelerated dramatically: although both Northeast Asia and Southeast 
Asia maintained positive growth in 2008 as a whole (2.9% and 4.1%, respectively), the growth 
rates turned negative in many countries after the crisis (see Table 1). Especially, Korea and 
Taiwan recorded growth rates of –18.8% and –13.7% respectively in the fourth quarter of 2008. 
China maintained a high growth rate of 9.0% in 2008, but the rate slowed to around 6–7% in 
early 2009. The Japanese economy was already sluggish even before the crisis, and thus it 
became the only country to record negative growth in 2008. In Southeast Asia, Singapore was 
affected most strongly by the crisis, followed by Malaysia and Thailand. On the other hand, the 
Philippines and Indonesia, which are less dependent on exports than other Southeast Asian 
countries, recorded relatively small declines in growth rate. Another important feature is that 
although the growth rate of the United States fell sharply, it was less severe than in the hardest 
hit East Asian economies: for example, the U.S. economy contracted by 1.9% in the fourth 
quarter of 2008, a much smaller figure than in East Asian countries which recorded negative 
growth rates. 
 
(Table 1) 
 
Weak domestic demand and high dependency on exports were major sources of the steady 
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growth before the crisis but then became a major cause of the severe contraction after the crisis 
in East Asia (ADB 2009b). Table 2 indicates that the export-GDP ratios of East Asian countries 
are much higher than those of the U.S., and they continued to increase until recently. Note that 
even in Japan where the export dependence used to be as low as in the U.S., the ratio has 
increased very sharply, doubling during the observed period.
4
 This implies that East Asian 
economies are increasingly vulnerable to external shocks, and indeed, the countries with high 
export-GDP ratios in Southeast Asia, such as Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand, have been hit 
hardest by the crisis, whereas Korea, Taiwan, and Japan have been affected strongly via the 
triangular trade through China, as shown below. 
 
(Table 2) 
 
2.2 Mechanics of the triangular trade 
Since the 1990s, the intra-East Asian trade of parts and components has grown greatly. The 
share of parts and components in East Asian exports and imports respectively increased from 
18% and 16% in 1993 to 24% and 25% in 2003, with China accounting for a significant part of 
the increase (Gaulier et al. 2007). According to Gaulier et al. (2007), China became a new 
location for firms in advanced East Asian economies (Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and 
Hong Kong) seeking to relocate labor-intensive stages of production. On the other hand, East 
Asia became more dependent on the rest of the world, especially the U.S. and the EU, for its 
exports of final goods (Gaulier et al. 2007). Haddard (2007) called such a trade structure in 
which a country/region imports parts and components, assembles them, then exports the final 
products to other regions the “triangular trade” and found that it is especially prevalent in 
electrical appliances. China has played a central role in the formation of a triangular trade 
structure as an assembly base (Lemoine et al. 2004, Haddard 2007). 
This triangular trade structure is a form of international fragmentation of production. The 
fragmentation is “the splitting of a production process into two or more steps that can be 
undertaken in different locations but that leads to the same final product” (Deardorff 1998). The 
                                                   
4 In this period, Japan‟s dependence on exports increased due to weak domestic demand and the weak 
yen against the US dollar, which was often supported by the low interest rate policy of the Bank of Japan. 
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international fragmentation of production is being driven by several forces, including the 
differences in wages and skills across countries and the reduction of trade costs (e.g. tariffs, 
transport costs, information) (Haddard 2007). The triangular trade in East Asia is a 
fragmentation process organized by multinational firms especially in Northeast Asia. 
Multinational firms in Northeast Asia―as well as in the U.S. and the EU―have segmented the 
process of producing a product into several stages, which are then allocated to each production 
site depending on factor intensities and technological levels. In particular, labor-intensive stages 
of production, such as final products assembling, are relocated to labor-abundant countries 
(Gaulier et al. 2007), and China has played a central role in this trend. Since the 1990s, foreign 
firms have increased their presence in China‟s trade and by 2007 accounted for about 60% of 
China‟s trade (Table 3). Together with the high shares of the processing trade in China‟s total 
trade, these indicate that foreign firms have established assembly bases in China. China‟s 
policies favoring foreign firms (e.g. tax breaks for processing trade, membership of the WTO 
and FTAs), as well as rapid infrastructure development in coastal areas, have contributed to the 
significant increase in the processing trade. 
 
2.2 Deepening of triangular trade in East Asia 
The triangular trade structure in East Asia has accelerated since China joined the WTO in 2001. 
Figures 1(a) through 2(b) indicate the trade flows of major commodities between the three 
regions, East Asia, the U.S., and the EU. 
 
(Figure 1(a)) 
(Figure 1(b)) 
 
The total trade flow of parts and accessories expanded about 1.8 times, from US$ 832 
billion in 2000 to US$ 1,515 billion in 2007 (Figures 1(a) and 1(b)). The transactions within 
East Asia increased most rapidly from US$ 186 billion to US$ 423 billion (2.26 times) 
compared with other transactions between/within the three regions. In particular, transactions 
between China and the other two regions in East Asia increased quite rapidly. In 2000, although 
China was already a net importer of intermediate inputs from the other two regions, the major 
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trade link was between Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. This occurred because Southeast 
Asia at that time was still serving as an assembly base, using intermediate inputs provided by 
Northeast Asian countries, especially Japan.
5
 In 2007, the picture changed dramatically. China 
became by far the largest net importer of intermediate inputs, US$ 66 billion from Northeast 
Asia and US$ 22 billion from Southeast Asia. These reflect the increasing role of China as an 
assembly base in East Asia. 
 
(Figure 2(a)) 
(Figure 2(b)) 
 
The trade in consumer goods is in sharp contrast to that of parts and accessories. The most 
remarkable feature in the trade of consumer goods is exports from East Asia to the U.S. and the 
EU, and they respectively increased by factors of 1.9 and 2.7 (Figures 2(a) and 2(b)). The 
figures in parentheses are the trade values of China with the U.S. and the EU. China‟s exports 
increased at a much faster pace than East Asia‟s total exports. In 2007, exports from China 
accounted for about 74% of exports from East Asia to the U.S. and the EU. On the other hand, 
the only remarkable trade of consumer goods in East Asia is the flow from China to Northeast 
Asia, especially to Japan.
6
 The other trade flows are very small compared with the trade of 
intermediate goods within the same region or export of consumption goods to the outer regions. 
The changes in trade flows described above reflect the deepening of the triangular trade 
structure, in which China imports intermediate inputs from neighboring East Asian countries, 
assembles them, then exports final consumer products to the U.S. and the EU.
7
 Such a trade 
structure is likely to have increased the vulnerability of East Asian economies to external shock, 
and the triangular trade became a major mechanism for transmission of the economic crisis in 
East Asia. 
                                                   
5 Since the mid-1980s, a large number of firms in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan have invested in Southeast 
Asia, which had become an assembly base in East Asia until being taken over by China. 
6 Japan‟s imports of consumer goods from China in 2007 stood at US$ 43,770 million, accounting for 
81% of Northeast Asia‟s total imports from China. Like other East Asian countries, Japan used to have a 
very low share of consumer goods in total imports. However, in just a decade from the mid-1980s, the 
share increased from less than 10% to around 30%. 
7 In 2007, the processing trade accounted for 45% of China‟s total trade (National Bureau of Statistics 
2008). 
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Section 3 measures the impact of the economic crisis on East Asian industries by using the 
Asian international input-output tables, and identifies how the impact of the crisis was 
transmitted in East Asia. 
 
 
3. Impact of the crisis on East Asian industries 
 
3.1 The model: Multiplier decomposition method 
East Asian industries were significantly affected by the economic crisis, with gross output 
falling sharply due to the slump in U.S. import demand. In this paper, using a simple 
input-output technique
8
, the impact of the financial crisis on East Asian industries is 
decomposed into four elements, namely, the decrease in gross output caused by: (1) 
intra-country multiplier effects; (2) feedback effects; (3) trilateral spillover effects; and (4) 
multilateral spillover effects. The method for calculating these effects is presented below. 
For a nine-country model, which excludes the U.S. from the original endogenous countries 
of the Asian tables, the equilibrium established in the system is expressed as 
 
    
𝑋𝐶
⋮
𝑋𝑇
 =  
𝐴𝐶𝐶 ⋯ 𝐴𝐶𝑇
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝐴𝑇𝐶 ⋯ 𝐴𝑇𝑇
  
𝑋𝐶
⋮
𝑋𝑇
 +  
𝐹𝐶
⋮
𝐹𝑇
     (1) 
 
where, 
     𝑋𝑟 :  an output vector for Country 𝑟 
     𝐴𝑟𝑠 :   an input coefficient matrix of Country 𝑠 from Country 𝑟 
     𝐹𝑠:  a final demand vector for Country 𝑠 (𝑟, 𝑠 = 𝐶, 𝐼, 𝐽, 𝐾, 𝑀, 𝑁, 𝑃, 𝑆, 𝑇)9 
 
Solving for 𝑋, we obtain 
                                                   
8 For the relevant input-output techniques, especially the analysis of the feedback effects, see Miller and 
Blair (2009). 
9 𝐶, 𝐽, 𝐾, 𝑀, 𝑁, 𝑃, 𝑆,𝑇 respectively stand for China, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan, the 
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. These countries are endogenous countries of the Asian tables, 
excluding the U.S. In matrices (and vectors) appearing in equations, we assume that countries are 
arranged in the above (alphabetical) order. 
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𝑋𝐶
⋮
𝑋𝑇
 =   
𝐼 ⋯ 0
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 ⋯ 𝐼
 −  
𝐴𝐶𝐶 ⋯ 𝐴𝐶𝑇
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝐴𝑇𝐶 ⋯ 𝐴𝑇𝑇
  
−1
 
𝐹𝐶
⋮
𝐹𝑇
  
       =   
𝐵 𝐶𝐶 ⋯ 𝐵 𝐶𝑇
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝐵 𝑇𝐶 ⋯ 𝐵 𝑇𝑇
  
𝐹𝐶
⋮
𝐹𝑇
     (2) 
 
where, 
𝐼:  an identity matrix (𝑛 × 𝑛: 𝑛 is the number of industrial sectors) 
𝐵 𝑟𝑠 : Leontief inverse matrix (partitioned) 
 
Replacing the final demand vector (𝐹𝐶  ⋯  𝐹𝑇) with the U.S. import vector for respective East 
Asian countries (𝑈𝐶  ⋯  𝑈𝑇), the gross output induced by the U.S. import demand is given by 
 
     
𝑋𝑈
𝐶
⋮
𝑋𝑈
𝑇
 =  
𝐵 𝐶𝐶 ⋯ 𝐵 𝐶𝑇
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝐵 𝑇𝐶 ⋯ 𝐵 𝑇𝑇
  
𝑈𝐶
⋮
𝑈𝑇
         (3) 
 
The Leontief inverse matrix in Equation (3) can be decomposed as 
 
 
𝑋𝑈
𝐶
⋮
𝑋𝑈
𝑇
 =   
𝐵𝐶𝐶 ⋯ 0
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 ⋯ 𝐵𝑇𝑇
 +  
𝐵 𝐶𝐶 − 𝐵𝐶𝐶 ⋯ 0
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 ⋯ 𝐵 𝑇𝑇 − 𝐵𝑇𝑇
 +  
0 ⋯ 𝐵 𝐶𝑇
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝐵 𝑇𝐶 ⋯ 0
   
𝑈𝐶
⋮
𝑈𝑇
  (4) 
 
where, 
 𝐵𝑟𝑟 = (𝐼 − 𝐴𝑟𝑟 )−1 
 
In Equation (4), since 𝐵𝑟𝑟  is an intra-country multiplier matrix of Country 𝑟, the first term 
post-multiplied by the U.S. import vector, 𝐵𝑟𝑟𝑈𝑟 , represents the intra-country multiplier effects 
caused by the U.S. import demand (Effect (1) in Figure 3 (a)). Other terms are relevant to the 
industrial linkages across borders or spatial linkages. The second term, the diagonal matrix 
post-multiplied by the corresponding import vector,  𝐵 𝑟𝑟 − 𝐵𝑟𝑟  𝑈𝑟 , indicates the magnitude of 
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the feedback effects in Country 𝑟 (Effect (2) in Figure 3(a)). Note that the feedback effects are 
caused by its own final demand, but its gross output is induced through the spatial linkages: for 
example, when the production of the Korean electronics industry is stimulated by the U.S. 
import demand, it will induce intermediate imports from neighboring East Asian countries such 
as Japan and China (reflecting their close production network), which then will generate 
intermediate demand for Korea, thus stimulating Korea‟s production again. On the other hand, 
the third term,  𝐵 𝑟𝑠𝑈𝑠𝑠≠𝑟 , indicates the magnitude of the inter-country spillover effects of 
East Asian countries on Country 𝑟. 𝐵 𝑟𝑠𝑈𝑠, for example, indicates the gross output which is 
induced by the U.S. import demand for Country 𝑠 but accrues to industrial output in Country 𝑟. 
Note that such linkage effects are transmitted via very complex channels. For example, when 
the production of the Chinese electronics industry is stimulated by the U.S. import demand, it 
will induce intermediate demand for Korea, thus boosting the production of Korean industries 
(here, the transmission channel of repercussion effects is straightforwardly expressed as the U.S.
→China→Korea). It should be noted that such a one-way trilateral channel is the primary 
transmission mechanism of repercussion effects in the triangular trade where 𝑟  and 𝑠 
represent Korea and China, respectively. The magnitude of the spillover effects can be 
calculated as
10
 
 
𝑇𝑟𝑠 = 𝐵𝑟𝑟𝐴𝑟𝑠𝐵𝑠𝑠𝑈𝑠 = 𝐿𝑟𝑠𝑈𝑠    (5) 
 
where 𝑇𝑟𝑠  indicates the magnitude of the trilateral spillover effects on Country 𝑟 through 
Country 𝑠 (Effect (3) in Figure 3(b)): 𝐿𝑟𝑠  represents the multipliers of the trilateral spillover 
effects. Although the above transmission mechanism is overwhelmingly important, it is not the 
whole story. In addition to the more visible trilateral channel, the repercussion effects are 
transmitted from Country 𝑠 to Country 𝑟 through various channels which may involve more 
than three countries. For example, when the production of the Chinese electronics industry is 
                                                   
10 In the input-output equation, the direction of transmission of repercussion effects should be read from 
the right to left terms. In Equation (4), for example, 𝐵𝑠𝑠𝑈𝑠 represents the gross output in Country 𝑠 
induced by the U.S. import demand through the intra-country multiplier effects. 𝐴𝑟𝑠𝐵𝑠𝑠𝑈𝑠 indicates the 
intermediate import demand for Country 𝑟 induced by 𝐵𝑠𝑠𝑈𝑠. Finally, 𝐵𝑟𝑟𝐴𝑟𝑠𝐵𝑠𝑠𝑈𝑠 represents the 
gross output in Country 𝑟 induced by 𝐴𝑟𝑠𝐵𝑠𝑠𝑈𝑠. 
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stimulated by the U.S. import demand, it will cause China to import intermediates not only from 
Korea but also from other neighboring countries, such as Japan and Taiwan. Then, through its 
extensive networks, it will further boost industrial output of other East Asian countries as well. 
Finally, if the final country uses inputs from Korea, it will stimulate Korea‟s industrial 
production (thus the transmission channel will be the U.S.→China→East Asian country 1→
East Asian country 2→East Asian Country 3 … →Korea). Note that, as shown in Figure 3(b), 
such multilateral spillover effects include the feedback effects between Korea and China as well 
as between Korea and other East Asian countries. Since 𝐵 𝑟𝑠𝑈𝑠 captures all the repercussion 
effects generated through both the trilateral and multilateral channels and 𝑇𝑟𝑠  is only relevant 
to the trilateral channel, then 𝐵 
𝑟𝑠
𝑈𝑠 − 𝑇𝑟𝑠(= (𝐵 
𝑟𝑠
− 𝐿𝑟𝑠)𝑈𝑠) represents the whole repercussion 
effects generated through the multilateral channels (Effect (4) in Figure 3(b)). 
Finally, from Equations (4) and (5), the impact of the economic crisis is calculated as 
 
  
∆𝑋𝑈
𝐶
⋮
∆𝑋𝑈
𝑇
 =   
𝐵𝐶𝐶 ⋯ 0
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 ⋯ 𝐵𝑇𝑇
 +  
𝐵 𝐶𝐶 − 𝐵𝐶𝐶 ⋯ 0
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 ⋯ 𝐵 𝑇𝑇 − 𝐵𝑇𝑇
   
 +  
0 ⋯ 𝐿𝐶𝑇
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝐿𝑇𝐶 ⋯ 0
 +  
0 ⋯ 𝐵 𝐶𝑇 − 𝐿𝐶𝑇
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝐵 𝐶𝑇 − 𝐿𝑇𝐶 ⋯ 0
   
∆𝑈𝐶
⋮
∆𝑈𝑇
        (6) 
where, 
     ∆𝑋𝑈
𝑟  :  The impact of the Lehman Shock on industrial output in Country 𝑟 
∆𝑈𝑟:      Changes in the U.S. import demand for Country 𝑟 caused by the Lehman 
Shock (i.e. in the period of the third quarter of 2008 to the first quarter of 
2009) 
 
3.2 Impact of the Lehman Shock 
 
(Table 4) 
 
Table 4 shows the trend of U.S. imports since 2005. U.S. imports from the world continued to 
increase until the third quarter of 2008, with seasonal fluctuations, but then plunged after the 
Lehman Shock in September 2008, and the strong influence of the economic crisis can be 
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observed from the fourth quarter of 2008. The downward trend continued until the first quarter 
of 2009, but reversed in some countries in the second quarter of 2009.
11
 Imports from China 
grew much faster than those from other countries, and accordingly the impact of the crisis was 
the greatest on China: imports from China dropped from US$ 96,150 million in the third quarter 
of 2008 to US$ 64,810 million in the first quarter of 2009. It should be noted that imports from 
Indonesia performed relatively well, while imports from other East Asian countries fell below 
the trend of U.S. total imports from the world. In particular, imports from Japan and Malaysia 
were stagnant and started to decline significantly earlier than the Lehman Shock. 
 
(Table 5) 
 
Next, Equation (3) is used to estimate the total gross output of East Asian industries induced 
by the U.S. import demand in each quarter.
12
 Table 5 shows that in the third quarter of 2008, 
Chinese output reached its peak and was induced most strongly by the U.S. import demand 
(US$ 211,893 million), followed by Japan (US$ 79,979 million) and Korea (US$ 29,512 
million). Induced outputs closely reflect the magnitude of the U.S. import demand, and are 
approximately two to three times as large as the U.S. import demand for respective countries, 
except for the Philippines where the said multiplier is more than four. The Lehman Shock 
clearly had a great effect on induced output, especially in China. Similarly, as in the trend of the 
U.S. import demand, induced output declined most sharply in Japan and Malaysia. 
 
                                                   
11 It is known that U.S. imports were tending to dip in the first quarter even before the crisis. However, it 
is obvious that the decline in the first quarter of 2009 was significantly larger than would be expected 
from seasonal fluctuations. 
12 The Asian table covers nine East Asian economies and the U.S. as its endogenous countries or regions. 
However, in this exercise, the U.S. was exogenized from the intermediate transactions, and the entire U.S. 
import demand (both intermediate and final demand) is treated as an exogenous variable. Then, to 
investigate the impact of the financial crisis, the U.S. import demand for the nine East Asian economies 
was given as an exogenous variable from the first quarter of 2008 to the second quarter of 2009. The 
number of industrial sectors in the Asian table is 25. For sector descriptions, see the Appendix. 
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3.3 Decomposition of the impact 
 
(Table 6) 
 
Table 6 shows the list of the top eight industries (out of 25 industries) in East Asia which were 
affected most strongly by the Lehman Shock. These industries suffered a serious decrease in 
gross output due to the collapse of the U.S. import demand, especially during the third quarter 
of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009: the industrial output in the nine East Asian countries 
declined by US$ 128 billion in this period caused by the collapse of the U.S. import demand.
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Such decline in output is then decomposed into four elements by applying Equation (6). 
Furthermore, the elasticity of induced output, i.e. the percentage change in the induced output of 
each sector divided by the percentage change in the total induced output, is calculated to 
compare the relative magnitude of the impact of the crisis on respective sectors. 
Table 6 indicates that China‟s gross output was affected most strongly by the crisis 
(US$ 68,987 million), followed by Japan (US$ 28,175 million) and Korea (US$ 7,176 million). 
In particular, “Textile and leather” declined most sharply. However, it should be noted that 
“Computers and electronic equipment” and “Other electrical equipment” were also affected 
significantly. 
The share of the spillover effects is relatively low in China: since China is a large net 
importer of parts and components from other East Asian countries (see Figure 1(a)), China 
affects them strongly through the triangular trade, but is not affected so much itself by the 
triangular trade. Moreover, the share of the feedback effects is even lower (less than 1 or 2 %), 
and the feedback effects are generally weak in all East Asian countries (less than 1%). Thus, a 
significant part of the impact of the crisis on China is transmitted through the intra-country 
multiplier effects. 
In Japan, “Transport equipment” was affected most significantly, followed by “Services” 
and “Computers and electronic equipment”. The rapid decline of “Transport equipment” reflects 
the trade structure of Japan which is heavily dependent on automobile exports to the U.S. 
                                                   
13 This is approximately three-fourths of the gross domestic product of the Philippines in 2008 (US$ 167 
billion, at current prices). 
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market. Moreover, since automobiles are a kind of luxury goods, their induced output was 
highly elastic (the elasticity is 1.3).
14
 Among the manufacturing industries, “Computers and 
electronic equipment” are affected strongly through spillover effects. Similarly, “Metal products” 
and “Chemical products” indicate high shares of spillover effects. In particular, the trilateral 
spillover effects through China are dominant. Note that these industries show a strong contrast 
with “Transport equipment” in which the share of the spillover effects is very low. 
There is a close similarity between Korea and Taiwan. In both countries “Computers and 
electronic equipment” declined most sharply, followed by “Metal products”, “Services”, and 
“Other electrical equipment”. It is astonishing that the share of the spillover effects, especially 
the trilateral channel through China, is extremely high in “Computers and electronic equipment”, 
“Chemical products”, and “Trade and transport”. It is also notable that the share of the 
multilateral spillover effects is relatively high for “Computers and electronic equipment”. These 
results suggest that extensive production networks have been formed close to China, where 
Korea and Taiwan supply a large amount of electronic parts and components, as well as relevant 
industrial materials and services, to China and then final products are exported to the U.S. Thus, 
the impact of the economic crisis was magnified via the spillover effects, especially the trilateral 
channel through China. Conversely, the share of the spillover effects in Korea‟s “Transport 
equipment” is very low, as in Japan. 
Southeast Asian countries also indicate a similar tendency regarding the electronic and 
electrical industry. Except for Indonesia, “Computers and electronic equipment” presents the 
most significant decline in Southeast Asia; in Malaysia where the total decline in gross output 
was the largest in Southeast Asia (US$ 6,130 million), this sector alone accounts for 54.1% of 
the total decline in gross output caused by the crisis. As in Northeast Asia, “Other electrical 
equipment” also indicates a large decline in Southeast Asia. 
Looking at the shares of the inter-country spillover effects, it is remarkable that they are 
extremely high in Singapore. In particular, sectors such as “Trade and transport” (trilateral 
60.5%, multilateral 11.7%) and “Metal products” (44.6%, 8.1%) are affected strongly by the 
spillover effects. In Malaysia, the said shares are high in “Services” and “Metal products”, while 
                                                   
14 Note that other industries in the table which were strongly affected by the crisis have relatively high 
elasticity. 
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in Thailand and the Philippines, they are high in “Computers and electronic equipment” and 
“Trade and transport”. However, it is notable that, compared with Korea and Taiwan, the 
spillover effects through China are relatively weak in these countries: only “Trade and transport” 
in Singapore and “Computers and electronic equipment” in Thailand exceed 20% in the 
trilateral channel. These results imply that although Southeast Asian countries are deeply 
involved in regional production networks, they are less strongly involved in the triangular trade 
through China, especially compared with Korea and Taiwan. This seems to be due to the 
difference in geographical distance from China: the closer to China, the more deeply involved in 
the triangular trade through China. In this context, it should be noted that the Philippines is 
strongly affected by the spillover effects through China (much more so than Singapore in terms 
of the relative share of “through China” in the spillover effects). 
Indonesia shows quite a different picture from other Southeast Asian countries. In Indonesia, 
“Crude petroleum and natural gas” declined most sharply, followed by “Forestry” and “Trade 
and transport”, while “Computers and electronic equipment” does not appear in Table 6, and 
only “Other electrical equipment” is listed as the seventh most affected sector. These facts 
suggest that, unlike other East Asian countries, Indonesia is not strongly involved in regional 
production networks centered on electronic and electrical products. Rather, it is involved in the 
networks as an important supplier of mining products. For example, Indonesia‟s share of 
spillover effects is very high in “Other mining” (63.6%, 15.4%). This sector also indicates a 
high share in spillover effects through China (26.1%, 8.7%). 
As shown above, China has become an increasingly important player in production 
networks in East Asia. The analysis indicates that the following networks of intermediate goods 
and services have been formed in association with the triangular trade, and thus the impact of 
the economic crisis was transmitted via these channels: 
(1) Network of parts and components, particularly those for the computers and other 
electronics industry 
(2) Network of industrial materials, particularly chemical and metal products 
(3) Network of primary commodities, particularly mining commodities 
(4) Network of services, particularly trade and transport services 
15 
 
Among them, Korea and Taiwan―as well as Japan and Southeast Asian countries to a lesser 
extent―are deeply involved in the triangular trade through China via Networks (1) and (2). In 
addition, resource-rich Southeast Asian countries like Indonesia are involved in the triangular 
trade via Network (3). On the other hand, Network (4) accompanies all industrial transactions, 
thus its output is affected significantly via the triangular trade in all countries. 
As described above, there are four layers of networks through which intermediate inputs are 
provided to the export platform in East Asia, notably China. Among them, as shown in Section 
2, production networks in the manufacturing sector have attracted keen attention from many 
researchers, because they have strengthened the competitiveness of East Asian industries by 
efficiently using the location advantages of various countries or regions. In the following, we 
again examine the production networks in East Asia and discuss their relevance to the shock 
transmission of the economic crisis. 
 
3.4 Production networks and shock transmission 
The results obtained from the input-output analysis above can be interpreted in terms of the 
progress of international fragmentation as discussed in Section 2. According to Lall et al. (2004), 
the intensity of production fragmentation differs across industries, depending on four factors: 
(1) the technical „divisibility‟ of production processes; (2) the factor intensity of the process 
(only labor-intensive processes can be efficiently relocated to lower-wage sites); (3) the 
technological complexity of each process (only simple and stable processes can be efficiently 
relocated); and (4) the value-to-weight ratio of the product (only lightweight and high 
value-added products can be shipped long distances to exploit cost differences). 
Considering the above criteria, Lall (2003) concludes that in high-technology industries, 
fragmentation is strong in electronics; in medium-technology industries, fragmentation is strong 
in automobiles, but the weight of the product and its high basic capability requirements mean 
that it only extends to a few proximate, relatively industrialized locations; and in 
low-technology industries, fragmentation is strong in clothing, footwear, sports goods and toys. 
Below we focus on these sectors and examine how the characteristics of respective industries 
affect production fragmentation which then influences the shock transmission of the economic 
crisis. 
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It is understandable that the electronics industry is very active in production fragmentation, 
because its parts and components, especially high-tech products, are small and light but high 
value added. Moreover, since they are highly export-oriented, they receive preferential 
treatment, such as unlimited access to imported inputs and exemption from import duties, and 
thus there is little incentive to raise the share of local procurement. Such characteristics in the 
electronics industry have helped “Computers and electronic equipment” (and “Other electrical 
equipment” to a lesser extent) to expand their production networks, and thus they are affected 
strongly via the spillover effects especially though China (see Table 6). The other key reason for 
strong spillover effects on the electronics industry is that these products are one of the most 
important export items to the U.S. market for many East Asian countries, and so they are 
affected significantly through spillover effects by each other‟s export performance. 
On the other hand, the automobile sector has quite different characteristics. First, parts and 
components in the automobile industry are in general bulky and heavy. Therefore, automobile 
assemblers have strong incentives to save on transport costs by procuring parts and components 
locally. Moreover, geographical proximity would facilitate “just-in-time” delivery as in the case 
of Toyota. In other words, strong agglomeration economies in the automobile sector give the 
firms strong incentive to procure parts and components locally, a trend that is often accelerated 
by the industrial policy of the host country which encourages the localization of parts and 
components production: actually, it has been shown that the local content in the automobile 
sector continues to increase in many East Asian countries, while the opposite trend is observed 
in the electronics sector (Kuroiwa 2008, 2009). Therefore, although the automobile sector has 
strong potential for production fragmentation, the geographical spread of production networks is 
limited. Therefore, as in Japan and Korea, “Transport equipment” is only marginally affected by 
the spillover effects, and the impact of the economic crisis is transmitted mostly through the 
internal industrial linkages.
15
 It should also be noted that only Japan and Korea are major 
                                                   
15  Note that “Transport equipment” also includes other sub-sectors, such as motorcycles, aircraft, 
shipbuilding, and other transport equipment. The shares of automobiles, however, are overwhelmingly 
high in exports of “Transport equipment” to the U.S. market, standing at 92% and 96%, respectively in 
Korea and Japan in 2008. Therefore the characteristics of automotive are strongly reflected in those of the 
“Transport equipment” sector. 
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exporters of automobiles to the U.S. market, so that the transport sector in these countries are 
not significantly affected by other East Asian countries‟ export performance. 
Clothing and other related industries also have strong potential for fragmentation. In the 
case of clothing, for example, the downstream production process (e.g. sewing and assembling) 
is significantly more labor-intensive than the upstream (e.g. spinning and weaving). It is shown, 
however, that the share of the spillover effects in “Textile and leather” is not very high in China, 
Taiwan, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines. This is because the localization of production 
in the upstream sector has already proceeded to a considerable extent, so large amounts of 
intermediate inputs do not need to be imported from other East Asian countries. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The triangular trade, which involves China as an assembler, neighboring East Asian countries as 
suppliers of intermediate inputs, and the U.S. as a final market, has been formed in recent years. 
Analyses using the multiplier decomposition method revealed that a significant portion of the 
impact of the economic crisis was transmitted via the triangular trade, especially through China. 
Moreover, the analyses identified four layers of intermediate goods and services networks in 
association with the triangular trade: (1) network of parts and components, particularly those for 
the computers and other electronics industry; (2) network of industrial materials, particularly 
chemical and metal products; (3) network of primary commodities, particularly mining 
commodities; and (4) network of services, particularly trade and transport services. The 
magnitude of impact varies across countries depending on the mix as well as the strength of 
these networks. 
It is also shown that China‟s neighboring countries, such as Korea and Taiwan―as well as 
Japan and Southeast Asian countries to a lesser extent―are deeply involved in the triangular 
trade through China and are affected by the crisis through the spillover effects. It should be 
noted that geographical distance is associated with the strength of trilateral and multilateral 
spillover effects. 
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Finally, production networks have been formed reflecting the characteristics of respective 
industries. Consequently, the electronics industry, notably “Computers and electronic 
equipment”, has formed extensive production networks throughout East Asia, and thus this 
industry is affected strongly by the spillover effects. On the other hand, parts and components 
production in “Transport equipment” and “Textile and leather” has been localized, so these are 
less significantly affected by the spillover effects. 
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Table 1 Real GDP growth 
 
Sources: Yearly data is calculated from the International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook 
Database, October 2009. Quarterly data is taken from the statistical bureau of each country. Some figures 
are preliminary. 
 
Table 2 Export-GDP ratio (Exports/GDP) 
 
Sources: UN comtrade database. IMF, World Economic Outlook Database 
and International Financial Statistics. ADB, Key Indicators. 
 
  
(%)
1995-99 2000-07 2008 2008 Q1 2008 Q2 2008 Q3 2008 Q4 2009 Q1 2009 Q2
Northeast Asia 2.5 4.4 2.9
(excluding Japan) (6.9) (8.3) (6.8)
China 8.7 10.1 9.0 10.6 10.4 9.9 9.0 6.1 7.1
Japan 0.5 1.7 -0.7 0.9 -0.7 -1.3 -3.4 -3.3 0.6
Korea 3.4 5.1 2.2 4.4 1.7 1.0 -18.8 0.5 11.0
Taiwan 5.8 4.0 0.1 5.1 -1.3 -13.7 -13.7 -11.3 18.8
Southeast Asia 1.3 5.3 4.1
Indonesia -0.3 5.1 6.1 2.4 2.8 3.7 -3.7 1.3 3.1
Malaysia 3.8 5.5 4.6 7.4 6.6 4.8 0.1 -6.2 -3.9
Philippines 3.4 5.1 4.7 4.4 4.4 5.0 4.5 4.4 4.4
Singapore 5.4 6.0 1.1 8.3 3.7 0.8 -3.7 -9.6 -3.2
Thailand -0.6 5.1 2.6 0.5 -5.3 -0.1 0.8 -2.6 -3.0
U.S.A. 4.3 2.6 0.4 2.0 1.6 0.0 -1.9 -3.3 -3.8
Yearly Quarterly
(%)
1995 2000 2005 2007
Northeast Asia
China 20 21 34 36
Japan 8 10 13 16
Korea 23 32 34 35
Taiwan 41 47 56 61
Southeast Asia
Indonesia 20 38 30 26
Malaysia 82 105 103 94
Philippines 23 50 42 35
Singapore 140 149 190 179
Thailand 34 56 62 62
U.S.A. 8 8 7 8
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Table 3 Characteristics of China’s trade 
 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics, China Statistical Yearbook, various years. 
 
  
(%)
1995 2000 2005 2007
Share of processing trade in total trade
Exports 50 55 55 51
Imports 44 41 42 39
Total 47 49 49 45
Share of foreign-funded enterprises in total trade
Exports 32 48 58 57
Imports 48 52 59 59
Total 39 50 58 58
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Figure 1(a) Trade flows of parts and accessories (2000, Million US$) 
 
Sources: UN comtrade database. Taiwan Directorate General of Customs. 
Note: “S.E. Asia” and “EU” indicate ASEAN10 and EU27, respectively. 
 
Figure 1(b) Trade flows of parts and accessories (2007, Million US$) 
 
Sources: UN comtrade database. Taiwan Directorate General of Customs. 
Note: “S.E. Asia” and “EU” indicate ASEAN10 and EU27, respectively. 
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Figure 2(a) Trade flows of consumer goods (2000, Million US$) 
 
Sources: UN comtrade database. Taiwan Directorate General of Customs. 
Note: “S.E. Asia” and “EU” indicate ASEAN10 and EU27, respectively. 
 
Figure 1(b) Trade flows of consumer goods (2007, Million US$) 
 
Sources: UN comtrade database. Taiwan Directorate General of Customs. 
Note: “S.E. Asia” and “EU” indicate ASEAN10 and EU27, respectively. 
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Figure 3(a) Transmission channels of the repercussion effects on Korea  
induced by the U.S. import demand (r = Korea) 
 
(1) Intra-country multiplier effects on Korea: 𝐵𝐾𝐾𝑈𝐾 
 (2) Feedback effects on Korea: (𝐵 𝐾𝐾 − 𝐵𝐾𝐾)𝑈𝐾 
 
Source: Drawn by the authors. 
 
Figure 3(b) Transmission channels of the Spillover effects through China  
on Korea induced by the U.S. import demand (r = Korea; s = China) 
 
(3) Trilateral spillover effects through China on Korea*: 𝐿𝐾𝐶𝑈𝐶 
 (4) Multilateral spillover effects through China on Korea: (𝐵 𝐾𝐶 − 𝐿𝐾𝐶)𝑈𝐶 
 
Source: Drawn by the authors. 
*Korean industries are also induced by the inter-country multiplier effects through other East 
Asian countries. Thus China shall be replaced by Japan, Taiwan and other East Asian countries 
accordingly. 
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Table 4 Trend of U.S. imports from East Asian countries 
 
Sources: UN comtrade database. Taiwan Directorate General of Customs. 
 
  
(Million US$)
2005 2006 2007 2008 Q1 2008 Q2 2008 Q3 2008 Q4 2009 Q1 2009 Q2
China       243,470 287,774 321,443 72,729 81,517 96,150 87,377 64,810 68,629
Japan     138,004 148,181 145,463 37,267 36,434 34,174 31,388 21,768 20,943
Korea 43,781 45,804 47,562 11,725 12,626 12,490 11,228 9,665 9,554
Taiwan            34,826 38,212 38,278 9,002 9,065 9,676 8,583 6,669 6,646
Singapore    15,110 17,768 18,394 4,493 3,963 3,915 3,514 3,356 3,675
Malaysia  33,685 36,533 32,629 7,966 8,247 7,978 6,545 5,016 5,229
Thailand              19,890 22,466 22,755 5,722 5,881 6,281 5,655 4,358 4,140
Philippines              9,250 9,694 9,408 2,208 2,153 2,294 2,058 1,630 1,486
Indonesia                12,014 13,425 14,301 3,662 3,826 4,402 3,909 3,253 3,059
East Asia 550,031 619,857 650,232 154,774 163,712 177,359 160,257 120,526 123,361
World 1,673,455 1,853,938 1,956,962 504,614 555,188 572,678 471,160 352,435 362,796
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Table 5 Quarterly gross output induced by the U.S. import demand 
 
    Source: Authors‟ calculation from the Asian international input-output table. 
 
(Million US$)
2008 Q1 2008 Q2 2008 Q3 2008 Q4 2009 Q1 2009 Q2
China 162,293 180,696 211,893 192,304 142,906 151,173
Japan 84,406 83,312 79,979 73,197 51,804 51,033
Korea 27,068 29,153 29,512 26,623 22,335 22,615
Taiwan 19,615 20,176 21,599 19,276 14,861 15,169
Singapore 11,873 10,912 10,992 9,819 8,985 9,791
Malaysia 16,709 17,368 17,026 14,175 10,897 11,478
Thailand 11,231 11,673 12,347 11,165 8,700 8,404
Philippines 9,603 9,614 10,086 9,063 7,106 6,829
Indonesia 9,128 9,458 10,568 9,414 7,966 7,524
East Asia 351,927 372,361 404,002 365,035 275,561 284,017
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Table 6 Decrease in gross output caused by the slump in the U.S. import demand 
(2008Q3 – 2009Q1) 
 
Source: Authors‟ calculation from the Asian international input-output table. 
*It holds that Intra-country multiplier effects + Feedback effects + Trilateral spillover effects through East Asia + Multilateral 
spillover effects through East Asia = 100%. The spillover effects through China is a part of those through East Asia. 
 
  
Elasticity
Intra-country Feedback Thru. East Asia Thru. China Thru. East Asia Thru. China
(Mill ion US$) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
China
1 Texti le, leather, and the products  thereof 9,953 98.8 0.1 1.0 - 0.1 - 1.0
2 Computers  and electronic equipment 9,498 90.7 1.6 6.7 - 1.0 - 0.9
3 Other electrica l  equipment 8,772 96.9 0.3 2.5 - 0.3 - 1.1
4 Other manufacturing products 7,149 98.2 0.2 1.4 - 0.2 - 1.1
5 Metal  products 6,424 93.3 0.9 5.1 - 0.7 - 1.0
6 Chemica l  products 5,721 95.3 0.8 3.5 - 0.5 - 1.0
7 Trade and transport 3,272 91.1 1.3 6.7 - 0.9 - 1.0
8 Services 2,388 95.6 0.6 3.3 - 0.4 - 1.0
All (25) sectors 68,987 95.4 0.7 3.5 - 0.5 - 1.0
Japan
1 Transport equipment 5,859 99.0 0.0 0.9 0.4 0.1 0.1 1.3
2 Services 5,645 93.6 0.1 5.3 2.9 1.0 0.6 1.2
3 Computers  and electronic equipment 3,732 67.8 0.4 26.2 14.9 5.6 3.2 1.0
4 Other electrica l  equipment 2,404 88.6 0.2 9.7 4.7 1.5 0.9 1.1
5 General  machinery 2,131 92.0 0.2 6.7 2.9 1.1 0.6 0.8
6 Metal  products 2,102 71.3 0.5 24.2 11.2 4.0 2.3 0.9
7 Trade and transport 1,917 75.5 0.4 20.5 11.0 3.7 2.2 1.0
8 Chemica l  products 1,082 66.2 0.5 27.9 16.6 5.4 3.8 0.6
All (25) sectors 28,175 85.6 0.2 12.0 6.4 2.2 1.3 1.0
Korea
1 Computers  and electronic equipment 1,717 49.4 0.3 43.3 30.4 7.0 3.3 1.2
2 Metal  products 917 66.0 0.3 30.3 19.5 3.5 1.5 1.1
3 Services 801 77.1 0.1 20.2 14.3 2.6 1.2 0.9
4 Other electrica l  equipment 618 72.9 0.2 24.2 15.6 2.7 1.1 0.6
5 Petroleum and petro products 578 82.5 0.1 15.1 12.3 2.2 1.0 1.8
6 Chemica l  products 563 47.5 0.3 47.8 38.8 4.5 2.3 1.1
7 Transport equipment 378 96.4 0.0 3.2 1.3 0.4 0.1 0.9
8 Trade and transport 355 54.5 0.3 40.1 28.3 5.2 2.4 1.0
All (25) sectors 7,176 66.7 0.2 29.3 20.7 3.8 1.8 1.0
Taiwan
1 Computers  and electronic equipment 1,747 56.0 0.5 38.0 27.6 5.5 2.4 1.0
2 Metal  products 874 77.9 0.2 20.1 15.9 1.8 0.7 1.1
3 Services 837 81.7 0.2 16.3 12.3 1.8 0.8 1.1
4 Other electrica l  equipment 454 84.8 0.1 13.6 9.2 1.5 0.6 0.6
5 Trade and transport 442 55.8 0.4 39.4 29.8 4.4 1.9 1.0
6 Other manufacturing products 374 85.4 0.1 13.2 10.2 1.3 0.5 1.0
7 Texti le, leather, and the products  thereof 370 87.8 0.0 11.7 10.4 0.4 0.2 1.2
8 General  machinery 353 93.9 0.1 5.4 2.9 0.7 0.3 1.1
All (25) sectors 6,738 72.8 0.3 24.1 18.3 2.8 1.2 1.0
Impact of
own country's export*
Trilateral
spillover effects
Multilateral
spillover effects
Total impact
(Decline in
total output)
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Table 6 (Continued) 
 
Source: Authors‟ calculation from the Asian international input-output Table. 
*In this sector, industrial output caused by the intra-country multiplier effects increased in this period. So the data is not 
comparable with other sectors. 
 
  
Elasticity
Intra-country Feedback Thru. East Asia Thru. China Thru. East Asia Thru. China
(Mill ion US$) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Singapore
1 Computers  and electronic equipment 901 61.3 0.5 31.1 10.0 7.1 4.5 1.8
2 Other electrica l  equipment 592 80.8 0.2 16.0 4.4 2.9 1.7 1.8
3 Services 301 68.8 0.4 25.7 8.9 5.1 3.1 1.1
4 General  machinery 162 70.4 0.4 24.5 7.7 4.7 2.6 1.2
5 Trade and transport 156 27.0 0.8 60.5 21.1 11.7 6.9 0.9
6 Petroleum and petro products* 133 1.0
7 Metal  products 96 46.7 0.6 44.6 12.5 8.1 4.3 1.3
8 Transport equipment 36 68.1 0.3 26.6 6.9 5.0 2.6 0.8
All (25) sectors 2,007 46.1 0.6 44.4 14.9 8.9 5.2 1.0
Malaysia
1 Computers  and electronic equipment 3,317 84.3 0.7 12.7 8.2 2.3 1.3 1.1
2 Other electrica l  equipment 959 90.0 0.4 8.3 3.2 1.3 0.7 1.1
3 Trade and transport 493 79.6 0.9 16.4 9.0 3.1 1.8 1.0
4 Services 187 74.7 0.9 19.9 6.6 4.6 2.9 0.8
5 Metal  products 181 78.9 0.9 16.8 6.1 3.4 1.9 1.0
6 Timber and wooden products 140 89.4 0.4 8.9 2.8 1.3 0.8 1.0
7 Food, beverage and tobacco 134 95.6 0.1 3.7 2.1 0.6 0.3 0.6
8 Texti le, leather, and the products  thereof 116 95.0 0.2 4.2 1.5 0.6 0.4 0.9
All (25) sectors 6,130 83.2 0.7 13.5 7.1 2.6 1.5 1.0
Thailand
1 Computers  and electronic equipment 811 60.8 0.4 33.9 24.8 4.9 2.1 1.0
2 Other electrica l  equipment 614 91.0 0.1 7.8 3.6 1.1 0.5 1.3
3 Trade and transport 278 70.3 0.3 25.6 14.6 3.8 1.8 1.0
4 Other manufacturing products 238 96.5 0.0 3.0 1.3 0.4 0.2 1.3
5 Services 197 86.5 0.1 11.8 6.3 1.5 0.7 1.1
6 Texti le, leather, and the products  thereof 195 94.3 0.0 5.2 3.2 0.4 0.2 0.7
7 General  machinery 171 75.6 0.3 21.0 5.5 3.1 1.4 0.8
8 Metal  products 160 88.9 0.2 9.2 1.6 1.7 0.9 1.5
All (25) sectors 3,647 80.5 0.2 16.9 9.8 2.4 1.1 1.0
Philippines
1 Computers  and electronic equipment 1,265 69.2 0.1 26.5 19.1 4.2 1.8 1.0
2 Trade and transport 316 67.2 0.1 28.3 17.0 4.4 2.0 1.0
3 Services 238 72.0 0.1 24.0 14.2 3.9 1.8 0.9
4 Other electrica l  equipment 203 94.2 0.0 5.1 2.8 0.7 0.3 0.9
5 Food, beverage and tobacco 184 94.6 0.0 4.6 2.4 0.8 0.4 1.3
6 Texti le, leather, and the products  thereof 161 97.9 0.0 1.8 1.0 0.2 0.1 0.7
7 Transport equipment 98 92.7 0.0 7.0 0.4 0.3 0.1 1.9
8 Metal  products 74 75.8 0.1 19.9 5.1 4.2 2.3 1.3
All (25) sectors 2,979 77.1 0.1 19.7 12.6 3.2 1.4 1.0
Indonesia
1 Crude petroleum and natura l  gas 431 73.1 0.1 20.8 3.3 6.0 3.9 1.7
2 Forestry 275 98.1 0.0 1.7 1.2 0.1 0.1 2.0
3 Trade and transport 223 69.1 0.1 25.3 8.3 5.6 2.7 1.0
4 Chemica l  products 192 85.3 0.1 11.7 4.4 3.0 1.7 1.3
5 Services 170 79.8 0.1 16.5 5.7 3.6 1.8 1.1
6 Metal  products 144 65.8 0.1 27.5 3.1 6.5 3.3 1.6
7 Other electrica l  equipment 134 87.5 0.0 10.1 2.2 2.4 1.1 1.0
8 Other mining 116 20.8 0.2 63.6 26.1 15.4 8.7 1.2
All (25) sectors 2,602 78.8 0.1 17.1 5.1 4.0 2.2 1.0
Impact of
own country's export*
Trilateral
spillover effects
Multilateral
spillover effects
Total impact
(Decline in
total output)
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Appendix: Sector description of the Asian international input-output table 
Code Description 
1 Paddy 
2 Other agricultural products 
3 Livestock and poultry 
4 Forestry 
5 Fishery 
6 Crude petroleum and natural gas 
7 Other mining 
8 Food, beverage and tobacco 
9 Textile, leather, and the products thereof 
10 Wooden furniture and other wooden products 
11 Pulp, paper and printing 
12 Chemical products 
13 Petroleum and petro products 
14 Rubber products 
15 Non-metallic mineral products 
16 Metals and metal products 
17 Industrial machinery 
18 Computers and electronic equipment 
19 Other electrical equipment 
20 Transport equipment 
21 Other manufacturing products 
22 Electricity, gas, and water supply 
23 Construction 
24 Trade and transport 
25 Services 
 
